25.02.2015 by Martin Kuppinger
In today’s press conference regarding the last week’s publications on a possible compromise of SIM cards from Gemalto by the theft of keys the company has confirmed security incidents during the time frame mentioned in the original report. It’s difficult to say, however, whether their other security products have been affected, since significant parts of the attack, especially in the really sensitive part of their network, did not leave any substantial traces. Gemalto therefore makes a conclusion that there were no such attacks.
According to the information published last week, back in 2010 a joint team of NSA and GCHQ agents has carried out a large-scale attack on Gemalto and its partners. During the attack, they have obtained secret keys that are integrated into SIM cards on the hardware level. Having the keys, it’s possible to decrypt mobile phone calls as well as create copies of these SIM cards and impersonate their users on the mobile provider networks. Since Gemalto, according to their own statements, produces 2 billion cards each year, and since many other companies have been affected as well, we are facing a possibility that intelligence agencies are now capable of global mobile communication surveillance using simple and nonintrusive methods.
It’s entirely possible that Gemalto is correct with their statement that there is no evidence for such a theft. Too much time has passed since the attack and a significant part of the logs from the affected network components and servers, which are needed for the analysis of such a complex attack, are probably already deleted. Still, this attack, just like the theft of so called “seeds” from RSA in 2011, makes it clear that manufacturers of security technologies have to monitor and upgrade their own security continuously in order to minimize the risks. Attack scenarios are becoming more sophisticated – and companies like Gemalto have to respond.
Gemalto itself recognizes that more has to be done for security and incident analysis: “Digital security is not static. Today’s state of the art technologies lose their effectiveness over time as new research and increasing processing power make innovative attacks possible. All reputable security products must be re-designed and upgraded on a regular basis”. In other words, one can expect that the attacks were at least partially successful – not necessarily against Gemalto itself, but against their customers and other SIM card manufacturers. There is no reason to believe that new technologies are secure. According to the spokesperson for the company, Gemalto is constantly facing attacks and outer layers of their protection have been repeatedly breached. Even if Gemalto does maintain a very high standard in security, the constant risks of new attack vectors and stronger attackers should not be underestimated.
Unfortunately, no concrete details were given during the press conference, what changes to their security practices are already in place and what are planned, other than a statement regarding continuous improvement of these practices. However, until the very concept of a “universal key”, in this case the encryption key on a SIM card, is fundamentally reconsidered, such keys will remain attractive targets both for state and state-sponsored attackers and for organized crime.
Gemalto considers the risk for the secure part of their infrastructure low. Sensitive information is apparently kept in isolated networks, and no traces of unauthorized access to these networks have been found. However, the fact that there were no traces of attacks does not mean that there were no attacks.
Gemalto has also repeatedly pointed out that the attack has only affected 2G network SIMs. There is, however, no reason to believe that 3G and 4G networks must be safer, especially not against massive attacks of intelligence agencies. Another alarming sign is that, according to Gemalto, certain mobile service providers are still using insecure transfer methods. Sure, they are talking about “rare exceptions”, but it nevertheless means that unsecured channels still exist.
The incident at Gemalto has once again demonstrated that the uncontrolled actions of intelligence agencies in the area of cyber security poses a threat not only to fundamental constitutional principles such as privacy of correspondence and telecommunications, but to the economy as well. The image of companies like Gemalto and thus their business success and enterprise value are at risk from such actions.
Even more problematic is that the knowledge of other attackers is growing with each published new attack vector. Stuxnet and Flame have long been well analyzed. It can be assumed that the intelligence agencies of North Korea, Iran and China, as well as criminal groups have studied them long ago. The act can be compared to leaking of atomic bomb designs, with a notable difference: you do not need plutonium, just a reasonably competent software developer to build your own bomb. Critical infrastructures are thus becoming more vulnerable.
In this context, one should also consider the idea of German state and intelligence agencies to procure zero-day exploits in order to carry out investigations of suspicious persons’ computers. Zero-day attacks are called that way because code to exploit a newly discovered vulnerability is available before the vendor even becomes aware of the problem, because they literally have zero days to fix it. In reality, this means that attackers are able to exploit a vulnerability long before anyone else discovers it. Now, if government agencies are keeping the knowledge about such vulnerabilities to create their own malware, they are putting the public and the businesses in a great danger, because one can safely assume that they won’t be the only ones having that knowledge. After all, why would sellers of such information make their sale only once?
With all due respect for the need for states and their intelligence agencies to respond to the threat of cyber-crime, it is necessary to consider two potential problems stemming from this approach. On one hand, it requires a defined state control over this monitoring, especially in light of the government’s new capability of nationwide mobile network monitoring in addition to already available Internet monitoring. On the other hand, government agencies finally need to understand the consequences of their actions: by compromising the security of IT systems or mobile communications, they are opening a Pandora’s Box and causing damage of unprecedented scale.
25.02.2015 by Martin Kuppinger
In einer Pressekonferenz zu den Veröffentlichungen von vergangener Woche zu einer möglichen Kompromittierung von SIM-Karten von Gemalto durch den Diebstahl von Schlüsseln hat Gemalto heute bekannt gemacht dass es Vorfälle gegeben hat – ob wirklich keine anderen Produkte betroffen waren kann man aber nicht sagen, weil wesentliche Teile des Angriffs, insbesondere in den wirklich sensitiven Teilen des Netzwerks, nicht nachvollziehbar waren. Gemalto zieht daraus den Schluss, dass es keine solchen Angriffe gegeben hat.
Laut den vergangene Woche bekannt gewordenen Informationen haben NSA und GCHQ im Jahr 2010 einen groß angelegten Angriff auf Gemalto und seine Partner durchgeführt. Dabei wurden geheime Schlüssel, die in die SIM-Karten auf Hardware-Ebene integriert sind, erbeutet. Mit diesen Schlüsseln können potentiell Kopien dieser SIM-Karten erzeugt werden. Mit diesen können sich die Geheimdienste in Anrufe aller Mobiltelefone einklinken, die solche SIM-Karten verwenden. Da Gemalto nach eigenen Angaben rund 2 Milliarden solcher SIM-Karten pro Jahr produziert und auch etliche andere Firmen davon betroffen waren, geht es hier um die Möglichkeit, dass Geheimdienste flächendeckend die mobile Kommunikation in einfacher und nicht nachvollziehbarer Weise abhören können.
Es spricht viel dafür, dass Gemalto mit seiner grundsätzlichen Aussage richtig liegt, dass man keinen Nachweis für einen solchen Diebstahl hat. Er liegt zu lange zurück und ein erheblicher Teil der Log-Daten der betroffenen Netzwerkkomponenten und Server, die man zur Analyse eines solchen komplexen Angriffs benötigt, sind vermutlich längst gelöscht. Dieser Angriff macht, genauso wie der Diebstahl von sogenannten „seeds“ bei RSA im Jahr 2011, aber deutlich, dass Hersteller von Sicherheitstechnologien ihre eigene Sicherheit permanent überprüfen und verbessern müssen, um die Risiken zu verringern. Die Angriffsszenarien werden immer ausgefeilter – deshalb müssen auch Firmen wie Gemalto reagieren.
Gemalto wies sogar selbst darauf hin, dass es immer neue Sicherheitsrisiken gibt: „Digitale Sicherheit ist nicht statisch. Der heutige Stand der Technologien verliert ihre Wirksamkeit im Laufe der Zeit, neue Forschungs- und zunehmender Rechenleistung machen innovative Angriffe möglich. Alle seriösen Sicherheitsprodukte müssen neu gestaltet und in regelmäßigen Abständen aktualisiert werden.” Einfach gesagt: Offensichtlich gab es Angriffe und es spricht einiges dafür, dass diese zumindest teilweise erfolgreich waren – nicht unbedingt Gemalto selbst, aber bei Kunden von Gemalto. Es gibt daher keinen Grund anzunehmen, dass neue Technologien sicher sind. Darüber hinaus hat ein Sprecher von Gemalto selbst darauf hingewiesen, dass sie permanent angegriffen werden und zumindest die äußeren Schutzschichten wiederholt durchbruchen werden. Auch wenn Gemalto einen sehr hohen Standard im Bereich Sicherheit pflegt, dürfen die Risiken durch immer neue Angriffsformen und leistungsfähigere Angreifer nicht unterschätzt werden.
Leider wurden auf der Pressekonferenz keine konkreten Aussagen dazu gemacht, ob und in welchem Umfang Änderungen bei den Sicherheitsmaßnahmen bereits vorgenommen oder geplant sind, außer dem Verweis auf eine kontinuierliche Verbesserung dieser Maßnahmen. Grundsätzlich sind aber auch Konzepte zu überdenken, bei denen es solche „Generalschlüssel“ wie in diesem Fall für die Verschlüsselung von Informationen auf SIM-Karten gibt. Denn diese Generalschlüssel sind natürlich ein attraktives Ziel sowohl für staatliche und von Staaten gesponserte Angreifer wie auf für die organisierte Kriminalität.
Gemalto bewertet die Risiken für den sicheren Teil seiner Infrastruktur als gering. Die wirklich sensitiven Informationen fänden sich in isolierten Netzwerken und es habe in den sensitiven Bereichen keine nachvollziehbare Zugriffe gegeben. Dass Angriffe nicht nachvollzogen werden können bedeutet aber nicht, dass sie nicht stattgefunden haben. Es soll laut Gemalto auch keine Risiken für neuere Mobilfunknetze geben. Von dem konkreten Vorfall seien nur 2G-Netze betroffen und die Probleme seien auch primär bei Mobilfunk-Operatoren entstanden. Allerdings bedeutet das nicht, dass 3G- und 4G-Netzwerke wirklich sicher sind.
Bedenklich ist auch, dass es laut Gemalto zu einigen Mobilfunk-Anbietern immer noch unsichere Übertragungsverfahren gibt. Gemalto sprach hier von „rare exceptions“ – was im Umkehrschluss bedeutet, dass es diese weiterhin gibt.
Der Vorfall bei Gemalto zeigt aber einmal mehr auf, dass vom unkontrollierten Handeln von Geheimdiensten im Bereich der Cyber-Sicherheit eine Gefahr nicht nur für fundamentale rechtsstaatliche Prinzipien wie das Post- und Fernmeldegeheimnis ausgeht und das Verhältnis von eigentlich befreundeten Staaten ausgeht – immerhin wurde hier ein französisches Unternehmen mutmaßlich im Auftrag und mit Unterstützung amerikanischer und britischer Geheimdienste angegriffen – sondern auch für die Wirtschaft. Das Image von Unternehmen wie Gemalto und damit deren geschäftlicher Erfolg und Unternehmenswert werden durch solche Aktionen gefährdet. Gemalto merkt hier selbst zu Recht an, dass das Handeln der Geheimdienste nicht akzeptabel und nachvollziehbar ist.
Viel problematischer ist aber ein anderer Aspekt: Mit jedem bekannt gewordenen neuen Angriffsmuster – und früher oder später wird das meiste bekannt – wächst auch das Wissen anderer Angreifer. Stuxnet und Flame sind längst bestens analysiert. Man kann davon ausgehen, dass die Geheimdienste von Nordkorea, dem Iran oder China längst davon gelernt haben, ebenso wie die organisierte Kriminalität. Das Handeln ist in seiner Qualität vergleichbar mit der Veröffentlichung von Konstruktionsplänen von Atombomben, mit dem Unterschied, dass man kein Plutonium, sondern nur einigermaßen fähige Softwareentwickler zum Bombenbau benötigt. Die kritische Infrastruktur wird damit immer angreifbarer.
In diesem Kontext ist auch die Idee deutscher staatlicher Stellen und Geheimdienste zu bewerten, sich Code für Zero Day-Attacken zu sichern, um damit Nachforschungen auf Computersystemen von verdächtigen Personen durchführen zu können. Zero Day-Attacken bezeichnen Angriffe, bei denen bei bekannt werden einer Schwachstelle in einem Betriebssystem, einem Browser oder einer anderen Software null Tage („zero days“) zur Verfügung stehen, um zu reagieren, weil der Angriffscode bereits verfügbar ist. Faktisch sind Zero Day-Attacken eigentlich solche, bei denen Schwachstellen schon längst genutzt werden, bevor sie von anderen als den Angreifern entdeckt werden. Wenn nun staatliche Stellen das Wissen über solche Schwachstellen nutzen, um eigene Malware für Angriffe zu entwickeln, dann setzen sie die breite Öffentlichkeit und die Wirtschaft einer massiven Gefährdung aus, da natürlich davon ausgegangen werden muss, dass auch andere diese Schwachstellen entdecken. Abgesehen davon: Warum sollte der Verkäufer solcher Informationen diese nur einmal verkaufen oder nutzen?
Bei allem Verständnis für die Notwendigkeit, dass Staaten und ihre Geheimdienste auf die Bedrohung durch Cyber-Kriminalität und Cyber-Angriffe von staatlicher Seite reagieren, muss man doch ein Umdenken in zweierlei Hinsicht einsetzen. Zum einen bedarf es einer definierten staatlichen Kontrolle der Überwachung, gerade dann wenn Staaten wie nun im Mobiltelefonbereich oder schon längst im Internet die Fähigkeit zur flächendeckenden Überwachung haben. Zum anderen müssen aber die involvierten staatlichen Stellen endlich die Konsequenzen ihres Handelns verstehen: Wer die Sicherheit von IT-Systemen oder von mobiler Kommunikation kompromittiert, öffnet die Büchse der Pandora.
05.03.2014 by Martin Kuppinger
A few days ago, Tokyo-based Bitcoin exchange Mt. Gox appeared to be in trouble. When looking at their website Friday morning, I only found meaningless announcements. They are “working very hard to find a solution to our recent issues”. Looking at the situation realistically, chances are high that the owners of the Bitcoins have lost a significant part, if not all, of their money. Just a few hours later, the news spread that Mt. Gox has gone bankrupt. while it is still unclear what exactly happened and what will happen now with the Bitcoins and Mt. Gox, this sheds a light on the concept of Bitcoins. Bitcoins were claimed to be absolutely safe. However, when you cannot use them but instead lose your “money”, this obviously is not the case.
There are good reasons for having trusted parties in the Finance Industry. Despite all the turmoil that industry went through in recent years, but also back in the Big Recession and in other times, the concepts worked relatively well.
On the other hand, the initial success of the Bitcoin currency also demonstrated that there might be a need for other concepts, aside from traditional currencies and the way financial transactions are handled. Even while the concept of Bitcoin might have been the wrong answer, that discussion will continue. Aside from requiring a trustworthy provider and exchange infrastructure, there are other questions to answer. One is about security, with an increasing number of attacks. Overall, there is a strong trend towards crypto-currencies. We will see a lot of evolution, we most likely will see failures and disasters, but it is not likely that crypto-currencies disappear again.
It will be interesting to observe how the Finance Industry reacts to that pressure. While Bitcoins are the most prominent topic these days, PayPal and other new players in the mobile and online payment market probably are the bigger challenge to the Finance Industry. PayPal in fact is a specific new type of Financial Institution. PayPal is a bank that knows how to provide APIs and how to interact with other players. It knows how to support the supply chains. It knows how to find the balance of security and customer convenience.
On the other hand, Financial Institutions still are trusted, when it is about money. They know how to do security. The challenge is how to make the banking business fit for the changing landscape of the Computing Troika (of Cloud Computing, Mobile Computing, and Social Computing) and enable them to provide their proven services for a world of consumerized IT. It is about API-enabling that industry.
However, that is more of a technical perspective. In fact, it is about moving banking IT to a level that allows Finance Institutions to leverage their strengths while becoming agile enough to compete with new players in the market. There is a strong potential for trusted Financial Institutions to do so. However, that requires banks looking closely at API Management and Security, BYOI (Bring Your Own Identity), trust and privacy concepts such as the Life Management Platforms.
EIC 2014 will dive into this topic in the Finance Industry Roundtable on the “Future Model of Banking”. Discuss and learn how to enable business agility by doing the things right in IT.
I personally believe that classical financial institutions have a strong potential in the future Finance business, despite Bitcoins and other concepts. I also believe in regulations. There is a good reason for regulations in the Finance industry. Having such regulations in place might have avoided the situation Mt. Gox and Bitcoins are in today. That is where the established Finance Industry comes into play: Making crypto-currency more secure by providing professional services, complying with the regulations. Regulations will come for that field – and then, the Finance Industry has an advantage again, if it is agile enough to support these new models by then.
Clearly, you might argue that the main value of crypto-currency is not about having a regulated and safe method of payment but one that is not traceable. It was Silk Road that brought Bitcoin to prominence. The question is whether there is a need for crypto-currency aside from the dark side of the Internet. I think to, with crypto-currencies being the “cash” of the Internet. No transaction fees, no fees for exchanging into other currencies. There is a potential value in using that type of currencies.
However, regulation and anonymity do not necessarily exclude each other. Take the analog world as an example: cash money lets me buy whatever I like anonymously, but the place where I deposit my cash (bank) is regulated. Banks should try to be clever enough to provide the trust that is created by regulation to the crypto-currency world.
14.02.2014 by Martin Kuppinger
NIST (the US National Institute of Standards and Technology) has now released the final version of their Cybersecurity Framework for Critical Infrastructures. As requested, this is not a set of new regulations or fundamentally new concepts for security, but, to quote my colleague Prof. Dr. Sachar Paulus, a “well-written summary document incorporating different approaches (lifecycle views, maturity views, communication aspects, risk posture analysis…) that helps getting an operational grasp on the necessary activities, and therefore well-suited as a guideline or education piece for technicians / practitioners. It is by no means sufficient (nor meant) to replace an ISMS (Information Security Management System). So: good that it exists, but in essence nothing new.”
However, it is very likely that it will lead, in consequence, to new regulations. Sector-specific agencies are obliged to engage in a consultative process with various governmental agencies to determine whether current regulations are sufficient for the critical infrastructures sector. This in consequence most likely will lead to new regulations.
When looking at the framework and its Appendix A, the fact that there is nothing really new in this framework becomes obvious. That leads to a simple bit of advice: follow common good practices and standards such as ISO 27001:2013 and CoBIT 5. If there will be a need for new regulations in future, this will happen because too many organizations in critical infrastructures do not follow established good practices.
03.12.2013 by Martin Kuppinger
Last week, the German BSI (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, the Federal Office for IT Security), published a document named “ICS-Security-Kompendium”. ICS stands for “Industrial Control Systems”. This is the first comprehensive advisory document published by the German BSI on this topic so far. The BSI puts specific emphasis on two facts:
- ICS are widely used in critical infrastructures, e.g. utilities, transport, traffic control, etc.
- ICS are increasingly connected – there is no “air gap” anymore for many of these systems
It is definitely worth having a look at the document, because it provides an in-depth analysis of security risks, best practices for securing such infrastructures, and a methodology for ICS audits. Furthermore it has a chapter on upcoming trends such as the impact of the IoT (Internet of Things) and the so-called “Industry 4.0” and of Cloud architectures in industrial environments. Industry 4.0 stands for the 4th industrial revolution, where factories are organizing themselves – the factory of the future.
As much as I appreciate such publication, it lacks – from my perspective – an additional view of two major areas that are tightly connected to ICS security:
- Aside from the ICS systems, there is a lot more of IT in manufacturing environments that frequently is not in scope with the corporate IT Security and Information Security departments. Aside from attacks to such systems, for instance in the area of PLM/PDM (Product Lifecycle/Data Management), there are standard PCs that might serve as entry point for attacks.
- This directly leads to the second aspect: It is not only about technical security, but about re-thinking the organizational approach to Information Security in all areas within an organization, i.e. a holistic view on all IT and information. Separating ICS and manufacturing IT from the “business IT” does not make sense.
The latter becomes clear when looking at new business cases such as the connected vehicle, smart metering, or simply remote control of HVAC (heating, ventilation, and air conditioning) and other systems in households (or industry). In all these scenarios, there are new business cases that lead to connecting both sides of IT.
Also have a look at our KuppingerCole research on these issues, such as the KuppingerCole report on critical infrastructures in finance industry (not about iCS) and the KuppingerCole report on managing risks to critical infrastructure.
05.08.2013 by Martin Kuppinger
When looking at the recent security news, there is one predominant theme: The NSA surveillance disclosure by Edward Snowden. There is some more news, but little “breaking news”. We might count the news about the SIM card flaw, however this seems to be less severe in reality than it was reported at first.
I will not comment much on the NSA issue. Both Dave Kearns and me here and here have touched on this topic. There are a lot of political discussions going on, with some accusing others of not telling the (whole) truth about what they knew. Interestingly, here in Germany the opposition is accusing the current government, even though they were in the government some years ago, thus being well aware of what has been going on at least since 2001. Clearly, this is not a topic for election campaigns and at least until now, it does not seem to be working out as such for the current opposition.
In addition, the reaction of Apple, Google, Microsoft and others did not surprise me. They are asking the US government to unveil more information about when they were urged to provide information to the NSA. That fits to what I have said from the very beginning: The entire thing is a business challenge, especially for US Cloud providers. Thus, they will create (some) political pressure. On the other hand: As long as there are no real alternatives to US-based Cloud services, not much will change. Maybe the shift from on-premise to the Cloud will slow down. However, over time the commotion will fizzle out.
Facebook usage in schools
Another news item that did not gain much attention is from Baden-Württemberg, the southwestern part of Germany I live in. The government of Baden-Württemberg has forbidden the use of Facebook for communication between teachers and their scholars. In some schools, Facebook has been used to communicate about homework and the results. However, this communication might include privacy-relevant contents. In addition, using Facebook mandatorily as a communications tool would force scholars into this social network. Thus, according to the order of the government of Baden-Württemberg (and in accord with the German privacy regulations), it is not allowed. As I’ve mentioned, there has been only little discussion in public about that – either the use has been rather limited or the decision has been widely accepted.
Teaching computer science in schools?
When talking about schools, there has been another news item. The German BITMi (Bundesverband IT-Mittelstand e.V.), the association of medium-sized IT businesses, demands that computer science becomes a required subject in German schools, starting rather early. Currently, it is optional in many schools and regions, and taught as a separate subject only in few grades, mainly in the higher grades. However, it is integral part of several courses in virtually all schools. Recently, Hamburg has decided to reduce the time spent on computer science.
There is some discussion about whether scholars really need to learn coding – which is part of Informatics as a separate subject, while the integral part focuses more on core competencies in using computers, the Internet, word processors, spreadsheets, etc. I think this can be discussed. However, I’d like to see some thorough education on IT security in schools, so that scholars understand this critical subject far better than they typically do today.
17.07.2013 by Martin Kuppinger
Last week I did a webinar concerning the recent news about secret/intelligence services such as the NSA and their activities, e.g. PRISM and others. This is not really news, but the broad and intense public discussion about this is new. In that context, many organizations have raised the question of whether they can still rely on Cloud Computing or whether they would be better off stopping their Cloud initiatives. Businesses raise this question especially as regards the risk of industrial espionage in cloud space – something that is not proven, but appears to be a risk from the perspective of many businesses.
The main points I made are that
- there is a risk in Cloud Computing, but we should not underestimate the risks of attacks against on-premise environments;
- encryption across the entire information lifecycle is a key element in information security especially for Cloud Computing;
- businesses need to understand the information risks to decide about what to put in the Cloud and what not, but also to evaluate the protection requirements for different information.
The entire webinar has been recorded and is available for replay. It is in German.
The attendees raised a large number of questions that I could not fully answer in the remaining time at the end of the webinar. Thus, I want to address some of these questions now.
Are there specific Cloud encryption algorithms, how secure are they, and are they already in use?
One question has been about encryption approaches for Cloud Computing and their security. In fact, there are several proven strong encryption methods out there. Most of the algorithms have been published. Clearly, there is a risk of backdoors in the installations; however, this should not be overestimated. Backdoors that are not easily available to the surveillants are not of interest to them.
There are no specific algorithms for the Cloud, which makes sense for two reasons. One is that there are several well-established and proven encryption methods already available. Another is that there is no sense in doing IT for on-premise and the Cloud separately, given that most environments are hybrid.
So it is all about applying existing encryption methods and algorithms, although the solutions might vary and range from secure email over transport security such as TLS to secure folders or simply encrypted files that are held on Cloud services.
Are there encryption approaches where the encryption is managed by the Cloud Service Provider, but all keys are on-premise at the customer?
The simple answer here is: No. The CSP would need access to the key for encryption, thus he cannot do this without access to the key. Once he has access he potentially can store the key or pass it to someone else.
How do we know that S/MIME implementations of vendors do not contain backdoors for the NSA, for instance via “key escrow”?
We do not know, for “closed source”. However, unless the vendor has access to keys, there cannot be any key escrow. Thus, that risk applies to Cloud Services, where keys are stored at the CSP. But as long as the keys are managed on-premise, this does not work.
How can I automatically support employees in my organization to better protect tools such as Salesforce.com Chatter or Microsoft SharePoint? These tools are rather unprotected by default. Can I use them at all in the manufacturing industry?
As with any tools, both on-premise and Cloud, decisions about procurement and implementation should take security into account. The use of Cloud tools favored by the business might require mitigating controls to deal with information risk in an appropriate way. More information on this is available in the replay of this webinar.
In general, organizations should implement the concept of Information Stewardship. You will find extensive information on that concept at our website and in the EIC presentations and videos.
I would not say that these tools could not be used at all. However, it is important to understand what information is stored or communicated using these tools and configure them accordingly – or restrict their use. Thus, it requires a thorough understanding of information classification and risk and well-defined policies, before these tools are used.
Isn’t there a risk in using encryption technologies to bypass security?
Clearly, there is some risk. S/MIME or PGP might be used to forward information to unauthorized recipients. It comes as no surprise that the Tor network is frequently used for illegal purposes. This is about finding the right balance.
How can I enforce confidentiality for internal communication?
Technically, many approaches for digitally signing email and documents are available, as well as encryption. Lotus Notes/Domino is one of the systems that has supported this for many, many years. S/MIME is a standard that supports this for email. Enterprise Rights Management technologies such as Microsoft RMS (Rights Management Services) can do that for documents. So there are various approaches available, many of these are rather mature. Thus, it is about re-evaluating the information risks and identifying an adequate set of technologies to help mitigating these risks, based on well-defined policies.
It is not a question of technology availability. It is a question of setting the organizational framework (Information Stewardship) and investing in security. With all the new incidents – and this goes beyond nation-state attacks and suspected industrial espionage to all the cyber-attacks of today – the equation changes. The risk is far higher today, thus investing in information security is increasingly an economic imperative for businesses.
What about article 10 of the German constitution?
The German constitution (“Grundgesetz”) defines on one hand that the privacy of correspondence, posts, and telecommunications are inviolable. On the other hand, the second part of article 10 states that the law might allow exceptions, especially for protecting the free democratic system of Germany or the state of Germany. That gives the government some freedom – so we should not be too surprised if we learn in future about the activities of the German intelligence/secret services.
Interestingly, one of the participants pointed back to the cover story of the German news magazine “Der Spiegel” from week 8 of 1989. That story was about Echelon and talked about the fact that industrial espionage was already happening. However, there was little attention to that story back then. Things have changed now.
Still, as I have said in the webinar: there is not that much news, and there are even less proven facts. Companies should just assume that their information is at risk and act accordingly, both in on-premise environments and the Cloud.
If you need our advice on that, just contact my colleagues at email@example.com and listen to upcoming KuppingerCole webinars on that topic.
25.06.2013 by Martin Kuppinger
The big topic clearly is what Edward Snowden unveiled: The PRISM program and some other nation-state activities on the Internet. In fact, this did not really come as a surprise. There have been discussions and rumors about such activities (and others) for many, many years. Maybe it helps driving forward risk- and information-centric security concepts and end-to-end-security instead of investing in point solutions. I will cover that topic in another blog post soon.
Facebook again struggles with privacy
However, besides PRISM etc. there have been various other security-related incidents and news. Facebook inadvertently shared eMail addresses and phone numbers of 6 million users with other members. That also comes as no surprise, given that Facebook always has been brilliant in weak security and privacy architectures and implementation.
Google under regulatory pressure – again
Google sees itself confronted with new pressure from regulators. The U.K. ICO (Information Commissioner Officer) has placed a legal requirement on Google to delete any data the company still has related to its Street View snooping.
In addition, the French regulator CNIL (Commission nationale de l’informatique et des libertés) ordered Google to change its privacy policies. Unfortunately, the fines are ridiculously low, starting at 150,000 €. Obviously, the plans of the EU to massively increase the potential fines and relate them to an organization’s annual revenue would put far more pressure on companies such as Google.
Old bugs appear again
Sometimes, security weaknesses appear to have a long lifetime. A bug that had been fixed by Adobe back in 2011 appeared again in the Adobe Flash Plug-In for Google Chrome browser. Adobe informed the public that Google is working on a patch for that bug.
And again plug-ins
Plug-Ins in general appear to be a potential weakness when it comes to security. The German BSI, the federal department for IT security, analyzed systems such as WordPress, Joomla!, Typo3, etc. from a security perspective. Most identified security weaknesses are related to plug-ins and add-ons, sometimes up to 95%. Thus, you should be (even more) careful when you start enhancing such systems.
Besides these news items, there have been many others. One of the positive reports has been that Microsoft and the FBI recently shut down a massive Citadel botnet. A negative one has been another issue in the DNS system where a human error led to the mis-routing of thousands of domains. Maybe it is time to start developing a successor to the stone-aged DNS system?
In general, the situation in security appears to remain rather unchanged. A lot of security bugs, incidents caused by human misbehavior, nation-state attacks and other activities, and the ongoing struggle around privacy, including some massive data leaks.
29.04.2013 by Martin Kuppinger
The number one issue in the past weeks is the LivingSocial hack, where attackers reportedly have stolen massive amounts of personal data, including names, eMail addresses, birthdates, and encrypted passwords. LivingSocial has confirmed an attack, but not the reported number of 50 million stolen data sets – which would be the vast majority of all LivingSocial users.
However, there still is relatively little information about the details. It is still unclear whether all non-Asian accounts are actually affected. (LivingSocial holds the Asian accounts on another server.) It is not publicly known how the passwords have been encrypted and thus it remains unclear to what extent the attackers might use them for subsequent attacks on other websites. Fortunately, it appears that the credit card information of the LivingSocial users is held in separate databases and is not affected by the attack.
Given that this sort of attack against large sites happens regularly, the question becomes what lessons are learned and what defenses should be taken. The lessons for the companies running such sites clearly are to invest in security, for both protection and monitoring. However, successful attacks will happen and, in contrast to some former incidents at other sites, LivingSocial at least encrypted the passwords and used a separate database for credit card information.
For the users, the answer is also straightforward: raise the bar for authentication. Reconsider using sites and services if they do not provide options for stronger authentication such as (good) 2FA approaches. Clearly using different hard-to-guess passwords is an option, but that is fairly inconvenient – my colleague Craig Burton once stated that you do not have such thing as a password muscle you can simply strengthen by training.
FIDO Alliance and Google
Another interesting bit of news is the uptake of the FIDO Alliance. Google now is also a member of this alliance and there is some chance that the FIDO Alliance might gain sufficient momentum to become a success. I will cover this in a separate upcoming blog post.
Reported number of attacks
During the past few weeks, several companies such as Symantec, IBM (X-Force Report), or Akamai have published their security reports talking about the observed number of attacks. I found two actually interesting aspects in these numbers. One is that the numbers are highly inconsistent. Some companies report massive increases in attacks, others some decrease at least for certain types of attacks.
The other interesting finding is one in the Symantec Internet Security and Threat Report 2013. The report says that the number of targeted attacks increased by 42 percent. This number stands for a shift towards industrial espionage, with small business being affected in 31 percent of those attacks. Direct attacks differ from the large-scale phishing attacks in that the attackers are looking for specific data or to cause concrete harm against specific targets, instead of just trying to phish as much data from their rather anonymous victims.
Data Broker Acxiom to sell data back to real owners?
You may not have heard of Acxiom, a company that describes itself as an “enterprise data, analytics and software as a service company” that is “known worldwide for our marketing database and consumer data”. There was a report that Acxoim plans to introduce a service that allows individuals to reveal the information Acxiom knows about them. In Germany, such services are mandated by law. For instance Schufa, a company that provides information about the financial credibility, offers such service. This is considered a part of your fundamental rights, in that case the “right for informational self-determination”.
Making a business out of this is a somewhat strange thing from a European perspective. In fact what Acxiom is said to plan is that people have to pay to learn about their data. The fundamental difference here obviously is whether “data about you” is “your data” per se or not.
17.04.2013 by Martin Kuppinger
This week, I read an article (in German) about a severe security bug in heating systems provided by Vaillant, one of the larger manufacturers in that space. The issue was found in so called “nano block heating systems” that are made for detached houses and duplex houses.
The entities have an IP-Interface that allows both the service technicians of the vendor and the owner of the heating system to remotely manage the device. However, a security bug allows pretty much anyone to easily access, in clear text, the passwords of the owner, the technician (expert), and even the developer. In other words: attackers can easily gain full access and control all settings. That allows increasing the temperature of the outgoing water in summer, which can damage the heating element. It allows stopping heating in winter, which could result in frost damages. There most likely are other types of damages an attacker can cause.
Even worse, these systems communicate with the DynDNS (Dynamic DNS) service of the vendor. That allows attackers to identify all systems in a simple way, just by “trial and error”.
Vaillant has announced that they will inform the customers, update the software – which requires, despite having an IP interface, that a technician visits the customers – and provide VPN communication for technicians.
This issue is a perfect example of what is happening these days in smart metering and other areas of “smart homes”. Vendors start adding IP interfaces, but they fail in security. In the entire segment of home automation, which is based on standards such as EIB/KNX, understanding of security issues appears to be rather limited. Security is understood as “availability”, not as being secured against attackers. That is, by the way, true for other standards as well – most bus systems in manufacturing are not secure at all. EIB/KNX does not even have a security layer. These bus systems typically rely on simple broadcasting. Who has access to the bus, has access to everything. Once you connect the bus to the Internet, things become obviously highly insecure.
The obvious solution for that is protecting the IP interface. However, as long as that is not done perfectly well, the problem remains. The entire manufacturing industry, but also the automotive industry and others that rely on rather primitive bus systems, have to fundamentally rethink their security approaches. Not doing this is wantonly negligent.
Smart infrastructures require smart security. Not having well-thought-out and well-implemented security approaches in place but relying on stone-aged security approaches for (sometimes) stone-aged bus systems puts us all at risk. There is a good reason for the massive potential of Stuxnet: It arises by opening up unsecure environments – unsecure by design – to the Internet, without appropriately changing the security approaches.